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Abstract: A purpose of this paper is to detect relations between planning systems and rewarding 
schemes in micro-, small-, medium- and large-sized companies. The conducted analysis is 
based on selected data from a research project focusing on planning, control and commu-
nication practices developed by enterprises operating in Poland. The paper refl ects infor-
mation and opinions included in 397 research forms. The empirical results provided evi-
dence on positive and statistically relevant relationship between character of a goal-setting 
process and reward strategies. It seems that participative as well as formalized planning, 
where employees take part in setting objectives or obtain plans with defi ned goals induces 
performance-based reward strategies, which are refl ected in merit pays or bonuses contin-
gent on individual or corporate performance. Likewise also managerial feedback affects 
in a positive manner reward strategy. The study suggests that there is statistically relevant 
difference in reward strategies considering sector affi liation.
Keywords: goal-setting process, managerial feedback, performance-based pay, reward strategies
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Introduction
Reward strategies are determined by many contextual factors which arise in particu-
lar environment and are induced by existing internal or external conditions. Arm-
strong (2010) maintains that determinants which infl uence reward strategies refer 
to organizational culture, business sector, work environment, employee occupation, 
business strategy, political and social climate, globalization processes, economic sit-
uation, societal condition, employment legislation and trade unions impact. There are 
also debates on effectiveness of reward strategies in connection with performance ap-
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praisal system (Lawler et al., 2012, p. 2). In this context employee knowledge on how 
their involvement in goal setting and goal achievement contribute to realization of 
business strategy becomes a crucial matter. The next step is properly organized per-
formance appraisal system which should be focused on motivational function of re-
ward and communication of a planning system with employee remuneration scheme.
A main purpose of this paper is to detect and defi ne relation between an approach 
to planning and corporate rewarding schemes in micro-, small-, medium- and large-
sized companies. An existence of expected relation should result in a higher effec-
tiveness of business processes. On the one hand the study examines an association 
between an intensive top-down communication and reward strategies implemented. 
On the other it investigates whether there exist any discrepancies in reward schemes 
considering company size or sector type.
The paper is divided into four sections. The fi rst part is dedicated to present an 
outline of the study, research sample, hypotheses and description of variables. The 
second part discusses various reward strategies identifi ed in examined enterprises 
and confronts these observations with statements on this topic included in the liter-
ature. The last section provides results of the empirical analysis whereas conclusion 
summarizes the study, presents its contribution and describes limitations.
Research Design
Research Outline
The results included in the paper refer to a study initiated by the authors in late 2010 
and continued until today. The research focused on a place and roles of management 
accounting, and in particular of controlling in enterprises, governmental institutions 
and NGOs.
At the phase of research formulation, it was assumed that controlling, and in 
particular: planning, assessment, reporting or internal communication processes 
could be identifi ed and evaluated more precisely by observing actual situation than 
by examining procedures which organisations affi rmed to have implemented. The 
assumption stems from the fact that numerous micro and small companies do not 
implement comprehensive controlling methodology or systems, but rather apply re-
quired elements of this concept to monitor their economic performance.
The focus of our study is to picture how organisations carry out control activities. 
Accordingly, the authors examined the following four issues. The fi rst was how com-
panies fi x their strategic goals and operational objectives. Secondly, it was explored 
what methods are used in order to evaluate economic performance and effi ciency 
of business process. Thirdly, it was investigated how management control infor-
mation is communicated to and comprehended by employees, including managers, 
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fi nancial and accounting staff, as well as employees of other functional areas and 
various organizational levels. Finally, it was scrutinised how solutions within data 
processing and internal communication systems help to build an organisational 
knowledge pool. 
The empirical part of the research was collected with a help of part-time working 
students who participated in controlling or internal reporting courses provided by the 
authors at their home university. In order to guarantee comparability of results ob-
tained, the students used a uniform research form developed by the authors. The form 
was structured as follows. The fi rst part provided basic characteristics of examined 
organisations (their legal status, foundation year, total employment, sales revenue 
or annual budget, business domain, geographical area of operation, and a capital 
structure). The second part included 16 open questions related to planning, control, 
reporting and communication processes in the scrutinised objects. The last part cov-
ered fi nal questions which aimed at verifying information obtained. They referred to 
position, work-profi le and experience of the respondents, sources of information they 
used and any obstacles in collecting data.
In the fi rst step of data analysis the authors evaluated quality of answers to ques-
tions 1-16 with scores ranging from 0 to 5, and eliminated those forms, where the 
average score was below 3.0. This meant that forms positively verifi ed included ei-
ther: ‘quite detailed information with a short personal comment’ (3 points), ‘detailed 
information supported with necessary explanations’ (4 points) or ‘very thorough, 
well documented account with profound refl ection’ (5 points). In the second phase 
of verifi cation the authors defi ned 6 most frequent types of answers to each question 
and attributed information included in particular surveys to those 6 options or to the 
category ‘other’ – if an answer was radically different from the majority of analysed 
cases.
The results presented in this paper will refer to positively evaluated forms describ-
ing enterprises which contained detailed answers to all questions analysed. Data sub-
ject to analysis comprised, therefore, 397 research objects. The paper will consider 
answers to questions relevant for the problem analysed in this paper only.
Sampling Frame
The table 1 characterizes structure of the examined companies considering: their 
size, establishing year and business area. A size of each class (integer numbers) and 
their shares in the whole analysed group (percentages) are indicated, as well. Dom-
inating values for each subgroup of companies (rows) were distinguished with bold 
print, whereas maximum values for particular answer options (columns) were shad-
ed. The same notation and visual presentation will be used in other tables presented 
in this paper.
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established before 1989 - 8 (14.8%) 10 (18.5%) 36 (66.7%) 54
1989 - 1994 8 (8.9%) 17 (18.9%) 19 (21.1%) 46 (51.1%) 90
1995 - 2003 25 (17.1%) 39 (26.7%) 27 (18.5%) 55 (37.7%) 146
2004 - 2008 19 (21.6%) 24 (27.3%) 12 (13.6%) 33 (37.5%) 88
after 2009 10 (55.6%) 4 (22.2%) - 4 (22.2%) 18
farming and food industry - 4 (36.4%) 4 (36.4%) 3 (27.3%) 11
industrial production 2 (2.1%) 11 (11.5%) 18 (18.8%) 65 (67.7%) 96
construction 1 (3.3%) 12 (40.0%) 7 (23.3%) 10 (33.3%) 30
trade and logistics 9 (12.9%) 27 (38.6%) 11 (15.7%) 23 (32.9%) 70
ICT sector 2 (18.2%) 2 (18.2%) 4 (36.4%) 3 (27.3%) 11
fi nance and insurance 13 (17.3%) 6 (8.0%) 6 (8.0%) 50 (66.7%) 75
services 35 (31.0%) 31 (27.4%) 20 (17.7%) 27 (23.9%) 113
Total 62 (15.6%) 93 (23.4%) 68 (17.1%) 174 (43.9%) 397
Source: author’s own elaboration
With regard to a structure of the research group it should be noticed that the large 
companies prevail (43.9% of the examined objects) whereas the SME cluster is dom-
inated by small enterprises (93 objects). Although such a structure of the research 
sample does not refl ect the actual profi le of the Polish economy, where micro compa-
nies are dominant, a considerable number of objects in each class makes it possible to 
compare reward strategies implemented by enterprises of various sizes. 
In this study a simplifi ed method for qualifying particular objects to size classes 
was employed. It considered total employment and annual turnover only, with typical 
thresholds. In case of enterprises where managers or owners were reluctant to reveal 
information on revenues to employees, staff size was treated as a sole qualifi cation 
criterion. In certain cases entities meeting size criteria of the SME sector were all 
qualifi ed to the group of large companies, since they had foreign owners and due to 
this fact that they were not fully autonomic.
Considering foundation year, it can be observed that 54 enterprises (including 
36 large ones) were set up prior to times of the free market economy in Poland, 236 
entities were established before the Polish access to the European Union in 2004, and 
106 companies started their business operations after that moment. 14 companies of 
that last group can be labelled as ‘start-ups’.
Respecting business area, the examined companies were grouped into seven do-
mains, including: farming and food industry, industrial production, construction, 
trade and logistics, information and telecommunication technologies (ICT sector), 
fi nance and insurance, and services. The most abundant categories included: services 
(113 objects, with 86 SMEs), production companies (96 objects, with 65 large com-
panies), fi nance and insurance (75 companies, including 50 large ones) and trade and 
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logistics (70 units, with 47 SMEs). Small companies were common in the construc-
tion sector (40.0%). The researched group contained only 11 companies of farming 
and food industry as well as those of the ICT sector.
Hypotheses Development
Participative planning refl ects an idea originating from an empowerment theory 
which emphasizes importance of sharing a power with employees. Due to participa-
tive planning a formal authority is delegated to lower levels of a company hierarchy. 
This implies various implications for companies. One of that is development of a 
knowledge sharing culture which facilitates employees to understand their role in an 
organization and contribute to achievement of goals assumed in plans (Bowen and 
Lawler, 1992). These two aspects require, however, intensive and effi cient internal 
comunnication. Performance-related reward schemes and power to make decisions 
that impact „organizational direction and performance“ are the other two implica-
tions of participative planning (Bowen, Lawler, 1992). With regard to these state-
ments the authors developed two hypotheses:
H1:  Participative planning induces performance-related reward strategies.
H2: Performance-related reward strategies are frequently met in those enterprises 
whose managers effectively communicate with employees and give them feed-
back.
Hypotheses H1 and H2 will be tested using correlation analysis and OLS regres-
sion model.
Descriptive character of a research form and observations provided by respond-
ents inclined the authors to formulate the third hypothesis to prove expectations 
which are as follows:
H3: There are statistically relevant differences concerning applied reward strate-
gies between enterprises which belong to fi nance sector against other sectors.
In order to validate hypothesis H3 the authors will apply Mann-Whitney test.
Description of Variables
For the purpose of empirical analysis three main constructs were used, including: 
strategic awareness (SAW), goal-setting process (GSP), managerial feedback (MFE). 
The fi rst independent variable (SAW) was established on a basis of answers to the fol-
lowing question: “Does an organisation draw up strategic plans and are employees 
made familiar with them?”. Respondents identifi ed 6 possible situations described 
in table 2. Each answer obtained pre-determined number of scores, which were as-
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signed according to a level of employee strategic awareness. Since interviewers might 
diagnose more than one described situation, the answers were weighted.
In order to construct the second explanatory variable (GSP) the following ques-
tion was formulated: “Does an organisation fi x operational goals for particular de-
partments, teams or individual employees? What does this process look like and 
who participates in it?”. The authors recognized six most frequent types of answers 
which refl ected the four major situations: participative planning (answer 1), top-down 
planning (options 2-3), rudimentary planning practices (answers 4-5) and ad-hoc or-
ganisation of work (option 6). To each answer were assigned scores on 5-range scale 
as in the table 2.
Table 2: Description of independent variables
STRATEGIC AWARENESS (SAW)
No. Answers Score
1. Strategic plans are drawn up for each area of business activity 5
2. A strategy is known to employees 4
3. Strategy is known exclusively to managers 3
4. There are some general long-term plans developed 2
5. Planning refers to one-year or even shorter periods 1
6. An organisation performs day-to-day activities 0
GOAL-SETTING PROCESS (GSP)
No. Answers Score
1. Employees participate in a goal-setting process 5
2. Goals are established by senior management in a form of a plan to execute 4
3. Superiors establish targets for the nearest period 3
4. Superiors express only general expectations towards employees 2
5. Employees are expected to perform their duties 1
6. Employees do not have a scope of their duties defi ned 0
MANAGERIAL FEEDBACK (MFE)
No. Answers Score
1. Employees participate in regular meetings with a management or superiors 5
2. Superiors discuss with employees their performance 4
3. There is an annual meeting with a presentation of performance convened 3
4. There are some briefi ng sessions for employees organised 2
5. The meetings include management only 1
6. There are no such meetings organised 0
Source: author’s own elaboration
The last construct which referred to managerial feedback (MFE) investigated 
whether there were any assembly convened to discuss corporate performance. In 
particular it was examined if employees took part in regular meetings dedicated to a 
discussion on fi nancial results or on performance, or else were informed about those 
issues in any other form. The structure of answers to this question is presented in ta-
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ble 2. The highest number of scores (5 or 4 points) were assigned if there was regular 
and direct communication between employees and management or superiors. Then 
two situations were distiguished when an annual meeting with a presentation of per-
formance or some briefi ng sessions for employees were organised. These cases were 
rated with scores of 3 or 2 respectively. Finally, when meetings convened include 
management only or there were no such meetings organised, the answers obtained 1 
or 0 points respectively.
In this study two contextual factors were identifi ed as control variables and ap-
plied in the empirical model. These were: company size (SIZ) classifi ed according to 
a 7-score scale and fi nance company (FIN) which was delineated as a dummy vari-
able. The control variable (SIZ) was established considering information on annual 
turnover and average employment. Accordingly, the authors identifi ed seven clusters 
presented in table 3. 
Table 3: Description of control variables
COMPANY SIZE (SIZ)
No. Option Score
1. The largest companies 7
2. Large companies 6
3. Medium-sized enterprise (larger) 5
4. Medium-sized enterprise 4
5. Small enterprise (larger) 3




1. Finance company (fi nance and insurance sector) 1
2. Other sectors (food, construction, trade, ICT, industry, services) 0
Source: author’s own elaboration
It is worth mentioning that two intermediate levels were added, for those small 
or medium-sized companies which in one of their size criteria (turnover or employ-
ment) were already closer to the upper class. The second control variable (FIN) re-
ferred to sector affi liation and separated fi nancial and insurance institutions from 
any other area of operations. The justifi cation for such a division was that qualitative 
assessment of research forms and, in particular, descriptive comments of respond-
ents brought the authors to a conclusion that fi nancial sector differed from other 
organizations in a way how they assessed and managed their employees. This can be 
explained by the fact that fi nancial companies focused more on results and paid close 
attention to fi ght for clients on the market which was highly competitive. All these 
factors forced fi nancial companies to implement performance-based management.
88 Joanna Dyczkowska and Tomasz Dyczkowski
Employee Reward Strategies
Literature Review
The era of knowledge-based economies has caused that human capital became a 
source of enhancing competitive advantage of enterprises. Therefore, appropriate 
organized reward system which effectively motivate people has become a relevant 
tool in employee recruitment and retention (Kessler and Purcell, 1992; Edvisson and 
Camp, 2005). Following Brown (2001) effective reward system requires three com-
ponents. Firstly, it needs clearly defi ned goals and a well-defi ned link to business 
objectives. Secondly, it should possess “well-designed pay and reward programs, tai-
lored to the needs of the organization and its people, and consistent and integrated 
with one another”. Finally, the “most important and most neglected” issue consists in 
“effective and supportive human resources and reward processes in place” (Brown, 
2001).
Edvisson and Camp (2005) remarked new challenges emerging in the so called 
„Mind era“ (Varga, 2002) which may change present perception of human capital 
and imply innovations in a way how employees are going to be remunerated. First of 
all, since it is easier to share knowledge, skills and brainpower through ICTs an issue 
„how to remunerate the growth of collective organizational capabilities for sustaina-
ble future earnings potential“ will grow in signifi cance (Edvisson and Camp, 2005, 
p. 113). Secondly, the intelligent remuneration system which appreciates knowl-
edge-intesive workers is expected to align company objectives with individual ones 
likewise in traditional context. Unlike, it should strenghten „the mind value added of 
an employee“ which is perceived as „an investor investing personal human capital in 
the company“ with an expectation of return on this investment (Edvisson and Camp, 
2005, p. 119). 
In this study various approaches to reward strategies were considered, including 
performance-based pays, pay rises or promotions for outstanding work effects and 
fi xed pays. Dependent construct was established considering the answers to the fol-
lowing open questions: “Are employees’ pays related to their individual objectives 
or those to be met by departments or by the whole company? How does this relation 
look like?”. Analysis of responses allowed to identify six various situations, which 
were rated as follows:
• merit-based compensations (5 scores),
• bonuses for individual performance (4 scores)
• bonuses for corporate performance (3 scores)
• pay increments or promotion for work effects (2 scores)
• remuneration should be linked to business objectives (1 score)
• fi xed pays (no scores)
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Performance-based pay system is closely related with a goal-setting theory 
(Locke, 1968) which pays closer attention to the motivating power of setting clearly 
defi ned goals (Marsden, 2004, p. 354) than to traditional reward strategies related 
with increments awarded to employees in a form of prerogative, which has no as-
sociation with performance appraisal (Boachie-Mensah and Dogbe, 2011, p. 271). 
O’Donnell and O’Brien (2000) remark that performance-based system and, in par-
ticular, merit pay schemes combine both foundations of a goal-setting theory with 
an expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). The latter theory assumes that employees 
comprehend the goals and believe that they are able to achieve them. Moreover, it 
underlines that staff members expect that they will be properly rewarded for their 
performance and extra involvement if they reach the goals (O’Donnell and O’Brien, 
2000, p. 21). The expectancy theory was widely applied by researchers who dealt 
with performance and motivation strategies (Green, 1992; Johnson, 1991; Mitchell 
and Daniels, 2003).
Though there are many forms of pay-for-performance the authors focused on 
merit pay, individual bonus pay and long-term incentive contingent on corporate 
performance. Merit-based compensation is a strongly motivating system since em-
ployees are rewarded directly for their individual performance. Accordingly, employ-
er rewards workers on a basis what they actually earned on employee contribution. 
However, there are some drawbacks of such compensation structure. It may imply 
unnecessary pressure among employees who will be concentrating more on meeting 
objectives than on providing high quality job. Bonus for individual performance is 
the other way of remunerating employees in a form of extra monetary reward which 
is given in addition to fi xed compensation (Park and Sturman, 2009; Milkovich and 
Newman, 2005). Although this way of rewarding employees does not have a char-
acter of permanent compensation and is much more fl exible its popularity has been 
increasing (Sturman and Short, 2000). Bonus for corporate performance is a long-
term incentive which links extra reward with excellent fi nancial results of a company.
Reward Strategies in Polish Organizations
With regard to employee rewarding strategies in Polish enterprises it should be no-
ticed, that in vast majority of companies pays are fi xed (62.2% of all the answers), 
whereas only in 10.8% of cases they were reported as directly bound to results 
achieved by employees (table 4). Fixed salaries prevail in small companies (63.4% of 
cases), although they are also present in similar extent in micro, medium and large 
organizations and in enterprises active in such domains as: farming and food indus-
try (81.8%), construction (73.3%), industrial production (66.7%), services (65.5%) or 
trade and logistics (62.9%). 
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micro 14 (22.6%) 8 (12.9%) 5 (8.1%) 1 (1.6%) 39 (62.9%) 13 (21.0%)
small 11 (11.8%) 15 (16.1%) 27 (29.0%) 2 (2.2%) 59 (63.4%) 9 (9.7%)
medium 5 (7.4%) 12 (17.6%) 22 (32.4%) - 40 (58.8%) 13 (19.1%)
large 13 (7.5%) 54 (31.0%) 59 (33.9%) 13 (7.5%) 109 (62.6%) 17 (9.8%)
Activity area
farming and food industry 1 (9.1%) - 3 (27.3%) - 9 (81.8%) 3 (27.3%)
industrial production 6 (6.3%) 21 (21.9%) 37 (38.5%) 5 (5.2%) 64 (66.7%) 13 (13.5%)
construction 5 (16.7%) 2 (6.7%) 8 (26.7%) 1 (3.3%) 22 (73.3%) 5 (16.7%)
trade and logistics 6 (8.6%) 8 (11.4%) 24 (34.3%) 2 (2.9%) 44 (62.9%) 12 (17.1%)
ICTs 4 (36.4%) 1 (9.1%) 3 (27.3%) 1 (9.1%) 5 (45.5%) -
fi nance and insurance 9 (12.0%) 32 (42.7%) 24 (32.0%) 6 (8.0%) 35 (46.7%) 6 (8.0%)
services 13 (11.5%) 26 (23.0%) 16 (14.2%) 2 (1.8%) 74 (65.5%) 14 (12.4%)
Total 43 (10.8%) 89 (22.4%) 113 (28.5%) 16 (4.0%) 247 (62.2%) 52 (13.1%)
Source: author’s own calculations
Interestingly, 42.7% of respondents representing fi nance and insurance sector 
reported direct infl uence of individual performance on bonuses received. This sit-
uation was frequently met since 46.7% of employees working in fi nance and insur-
ance sector confi rmed that they had their goals established by senior management 
in a form of plan to execute what induced such a way of rewarding. Interviewers 
employed in industrial production sector indicated that the most common form of 
rewarding employees was bonus for corporate performance. Likewise, industrial 
production sector can be characterized by a top-down style of goal-setting process 
since 43.8% of respondents indicated such a situation which was more common 
than participative management style (only 27.1% of respondents declared that they 
participated in goal-setting process). It should be noticed, however, that indirect re-
lation between performance and employee reward systems, where bonuses depend 
on overall corporate performance, implies ambiguous reactions of employees. On 
the one hand, quarterly or annual bonuses are, obviously, welcome. They prove 
also positive situation of a company, what should result in stability of employment. 
But on the other one, such bonuses are treated as “additional salary”. If their level 
depend on position in organizational hierarchy only, they have limited impact on 
work effi ciency of individuals. Moreover, lack of quarterly bonus may be judged as 
cut in personal cost.
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Only in 13.1% of cases fi xed salaries were unwelcome, as employees expected 
additional benefi ts due to their engagement and individual performance. Two reasons 
for the described attitude were identifi ed on a base of detailed explanations included 
in research forms. First of all, the vast majority of respondents – and employees at 
the same time – had rather short work experience, and therefore stability of work 
may have been prioritized. It should be pointed out that remuneration directly linked 
to results is often calculated as commission on turnover paid to people employed on 
casual work contracts, what may imply fi nancial instability. Secondly, in numerous 
answers bonus systems depending on individual or group performance were per-
ceived as disadvantageous due to excessive targets which employees had to meet in 
order to receive additional fi nancial incentives. In many cases, exorbitant expecta-
tions were combined with very modest basic salaries. Constant diffi culties – despite 
initial attempts – to meet targets, together with pressure of supervisors – whose re-
muneration may also be related to sales targets – trigger destructive internal com-
petition, cause negative atmosphere at work and demotivate employees. As a result, 
overall performance is negatively affected.
In fact, an association between employees’ performance and their remuneration is 
much more accepted, if performance appraisal is not limited to individual sales ratios 
only, but includes more sophisticated criteria, or if a positive incentive system is used. 
The latter solution is often based on fi xed salaries and performance-related bonus, 
where individual sales fi gures below expectations have to be discussed with a team 
manager but do not imply fi nancial penalties. Such reward systems can be observed 
in large companies (31.0% of answers), in particular in those active in fi nance and in-
surance sector. As long as employees meet their individual targets or believe they are 
capable of doing that, they appreciate construction of a motivation system. However, 
constant lack of bonuses will be considered as demotivating as fi nancial penalties for 
unsatisfactory performance.
The results presented in table 4 demonstrate relative insignifi cance of structural 
motivation tools which link excellent individual performance with pay rise or pro-
motion in organizational hierarchy. Such solutions were referred to in 4,0% of cases 
only, mostly in large companies (7.5% of answers). Detailed explanations provided by 
interviewers proved, however, that the forgoing solutions were integrated with corpo-
rate human resources policies, and as such were very positively rated by employees.
Research Results
Table 5 reports on the Pearson correlations between all variables. First of all, it has 
to be pointed out that positive, and statistically valid correlations (p<0.01) between 
reward strategy and explanatory variables: strategic awareness (18.9%), goal-setting 
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process (24.8%) and managerial feedback (20.2%) were observed. This should be 
interpreted as a positive signal for validation of the hypotheses H1 and H2. Unex-
pectedly, there was no evidence that the contextual variable “company size” affect-
ed reward strategy. Accordingly, company size was excluded from OLS regression 
model as a control variable. The second control variable is positively correlated with 
dependent variable. It signals that hypothesis H3 may be accepted. 
Table 5: Correlation matrix (n = 397)


























) 0.065 ***0.498 ***0.287 0.243 1.000
p=0.195 p=0.00 p=0.000 p=0.000
FIN (X
5
) ***0.222 **0.100 ***0.136 ***0.132 ***0.197 1.000
p=0.000 p=0.046 p=0.007 p=0.008 p=0.000
*signifi cant at 10% level; **signifi cant at 5% level; ***signifi cant at 1% level.
Source: author’s own calculations
Table 6 presents results of regression analysis, in particular, coeffi cients, variance 
infl ation factors, the R2, adjusted R2, value of F statistics, standard error of estimate 
as well as related signifi cance levels (t-test). It has to be noticed that although the 
explanatory power of a model is rather low, since it explains about 10.6% of the var-
iance in reward strategy, the developed model is statistically valid. In comparison to 
correlation analysis OLS regression model singled out strategic awareness as statisti-
cally irrelevant factor for dependent variable. Both goal-setting process, managerial 
feedback and control variable (FIN) proved to be meaningful determinants of ap-
plied reward strategy at 1%, 5% and 1% signifi cance levels respectively. These results 
may confi rm assumed hypotheses H1 and H2.
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Variance infl ation 
factors1
Intercept ***0.701
Strategic awareness (SAW) 0.070 1.298
Goal-setting process (GSP) ***0.193 1.312
Managerial feedback (MFE) **0.101 1.168




F (4, 392) 12.720
p < 0.000
Std. error of estimate 1.614
*signifi cant at 10% level; **signifi cant at 5% level; 
***signifi cant at 1% level.
Source: author’s own calculations
In order to validate hypothesis H3 the authors used non-parametrical Mann-Whit-
ney test. (FIN) is a dummy grouping variable in this analysis. The fi rst group covers 
fi nancial companies (74 objects) whereas the second one - companies from other 
sectors (323 objects). Mean ranks indicate that fi nancial companies strove more for 
performance-based reward strategies than fi rms from the other sectors. With regard 
to research results it is argued that there is statistically relevant difference (p<0.00) 
in reward strategies considering sector affi liation, therefore hypothesis 3 should be 
accepted. 
Table 7: Sector type against reward strategy (n = 397)
Grouping variable N Mean rank Sum of ranks U Mann-Whitney: 7840.50 
Z: 4.616 
Sig (2-tailed): 0.000
1. Finance and insurance 74 254,55 18836,50
2. Other sectors 323 186,27 60166,50
Source: author’s own calculations
Concluding Remarks
The conducted analysis allowed to draw some conclusions. Firstly, the vast majority 
of companies paid fi xed salaries. Moreover, only in 13.1% of cases fi xed salaries were 
openly declared as unwelcome. Secondly, 28.5% of the examined organizations (113 
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objects) informed that they compensated their employees regarding corporate perfor-
mance. It may be a positive signal, however, some researchers claim that disadvan-
tage of such bonus is that employees may not clearly notice an association between 
their own performance, other co-workers’ performance along with corporate objec-
tives (Boswell and Boudreau, 2001). Thirdly, situation when goal achievement results 
in individual bonus was met in 22.4% of the research sample, mostly in large com-
panies and those with foreign investor. Only in case of 10.8% companies merit-based 
pay was reported. Interestingly, merit-based compensation was applied mostly by 
companies established after 2009 (38.9%) and those from ICT sector (36.4%) which 
suggests that this reward strategy has become popular recently. The next remark is 
that pay increments or promotion for work effects were not frequently met in Polish 
enterprises which implies poorly developed motivational system which does not ap-
preciate extra work effects if they are not directly connected with goals determined 
in plans and evaluated within performance appraisal.
The authors made an attempt to prove three formulated hypothesis. The empirical 
results of the OLS regression analysis provided evidence on positive and statistically 
relevant relation between character of a goal-setting process and reward strategies. 
It seems that participative as well as formalized planning, where employees take 
part in setting objectives or obtain plans with clearly defi ned goals and tasks induc-
es performance-based reward strategies aiming at merit pays or bonuses contingent 
on individual or corporate performance. This relation was statistically valid at 1% 
signifi cance level. Likewise also managerial feedback affects in a positive manner 
reward strategy (p<0.05). Moreover, there is evidence in literature that companies 
which put emphasis on performance feedback and constructive discussion with staff 
members found also an increase in employee approval of performance-based pays 
(Lewis, 1998, p.75). O’Donnell and O’Brien (2000) argue, however, that superiors 
may be unwilling to provide staff members with critical feedback since they do not 
intend to initiate confl icts during appraisal interviews and, indeed, they fi nish discus-
sion on employee performance as quickly as possible.
The study suggests also that there is statistically relevant difference (p<0.00) in 
reward strategies considering sector affi liation. Financial companies were more like-
ly to compensate employees considering their performance than organizations rep-
resenting the other sectors. The explanation is an approach of fi nancial companies 
to planning process. Almost a half of examined fi nancial organizations reported that 
they have their goals established by senior management in a form of plan to execute 
which may imply periodical performance appraisals.
This paper’s contribution is signifi cant for Polish enterprises since it addresses a 
problem of motivation and compensation of employees in connection with planning. 
It provides evidence to substantiate the statement that integration of planning and 
rewarding systems in companies operating in Poland is proceeding, though it is not 
a dominating situation.
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